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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A proceeding before the Supreme Court is a summary proceed-
ing in which some of an attorney's rights are not protected in the
traditional manner.2 1 However, recent cases have by implication over-
ruled prior decisions which entitled the accused attorney to a jury
trial.22 Notice and opportunity for a hearing must be given the at-
torney, but courts may inquire into the conduct of attorneys without
infringing rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States 23 and without violating the Indiana Con-
stitution.24
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIONS BY FALIURE TO ANSWER LETTERS
Plaintiff sued to recover amounts deducted from his salary for
pension reserves. On a counterclaim for losses resulting from plain-
tiff's acts, defendant, among other things, introduced in evidence
letters, detailing specific items of plaintiff's embezzlements, which
were delivered to plaintiff, but to which plaintiff made no reply.
Held, this failure to reply constituted tacit admission of the charges
in the letters. Boerner v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 387 (C.C.A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 587 (1941), (1942) 17 iND. L. T. 438.
The familiar legal maxim, qui tacet consentire videtur (silence gives
consent) is not generally applicable to unanswered letters, as it is
power included all powers necessary for the complete performance
of judicial functions, including the power to discipline or disbar
attorneys for misconduct, and to punish for contempt those who
practiced without authority. That such power does not vest by.
virtue of the fact that the attorney is admitted to the bar of
the Supreme Court, but that it extends throughout its territorialjurisdiction.
21 In re Darrow, 175 Ind. 14, 92 N. E. 309 (1910) (pleadings and trial
shall be the same as in other cases of a civil nature: there shall
be adverse parties, issues joined, a jury trial, and change of venue
if necessary); Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531 (1879) (entitled to
notice and trial); Heffner v. Joyne, 39 Ind. 463 (1872) (complaint
must request disbarment); Reilly, v. Cavanough, 32 Ind. 214 (1869)
(attorney is authorized by statute to demand that issues formed
be tried by jury); Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47 (1867) (charges must
be filed and attorney accorded notice and opportunity for hear-
ing). Contra: Ex parte Robinson, 3 Ind. 52 (1851) (not entitled
to jury trial).
22 In re Hardy, 217 Ind. 159, 26 N. E. (2d) 921 (1940); State ex rel.
Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Hartman, 216 Ind. 89, 23 N. E. (2d)
477 (1939).
23 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 289, 2 S. Ct. 569, 588, 589, 27
L. Ed. 552, 561, 562 (1882). The contention that a summary
proceeding against an attorney to exclude him from the practice
of law for acts for which he may be indicted and held for trial
by jury is in violation of the Fifth Amendment as depriving him
of property without due process of law is unfounded. "It is a
mistaken idea that due process of law requires a plenary suit
and a trial by jury, in all cases where property or personal rights
are involved." In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 3 N. E. (2d) 248
(1936); In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
6 Ri C. L. (1915) § 453, Constitutional Law.
24 See note 22, aupra.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to unanswered oral statements. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)
§§ 1071, 1073 (3). The general rule seems to be that an unanswered
letter which is not part of a mutual correspondence is not admissible
in favor of the writer as evidence of the statements contained therein.
Leach and Co. v. Pierson, 275 U.S. 120, 128, 55 A. L. R. 457, 459 (1927) ;
Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 924, 925 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Packer
v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 908 to 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901);
Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 797, 798, 121 S. E. 82, 85, 34
A. L. R. 550, 555 (1924). Three recognized exceptions to the general
rule are: letters part of the res gestae, Murray v. East End Improve-
ment Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1477, 60 S. W. 648, 650 (1901); letters
relating to an existing contract, Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Par-
rish, 13 Ga. App. 779, 80 S. E. 28 (1913); Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me.
223, 91 Ati. 952 (1914); Sturtevant v. Wallack, 141 Mass. 119, 4 N. E.
615 (1886); and letters containing demand or notice, Morris v. Norton,
75 Fed. 912, 924 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Hays v. Morgan, 87 Ind. 231
(1882). The third exception is the most applicable to the principal
case, but the general qualification is that the letter can be admitted
only to show that demand or notice was given to addressee, and not
that the substantive matter of the letter has been admitted. Morris
v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 924, 925 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896). These letters
might be admitted by the court on the grounds that the plaintiff's
failure to answer was nonassertive conduct tending to show his ad-
mission of the matter contained therein, Falkner, Silence as Hearsay
(1940) 89 U. OP PA. L. REV. 192; ie., that there was a duty on his
part to answer the letters. Benn v. Forrest, 213 Fed. 763, 765, 766
(C. C. A. 1st, 1914).
An unequivocal general rule on this point seems impractical, and
precedent indicates that each case must be decided by its peculiar set
of facts. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1073 (3); Lord and
Spencer, Inc. v. M. N. Stout Co., 33 F. (2d) 60, 62 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
Strict adherence to the general rule, if such a rule can be claimed,
would perhaps indicate that the court improperly admitted the letters
in evidence, for the particular facts do not appear to be sufficient
to allow the admissibility of these letters under the general rule.
The court resolves this question, allowing admissibility, under
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a), 28 u. S. C. A. §§ 723 (b),
723 (c) (1938), which directs the federal courts to follow the rule,
whether state or federal, which favors admissibility.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ANOTHER JEHOVAH'S WITNESS CASE
The city of Opelika, Alabama, filed a complaint charging pe-
titioner with the violation of a licensing ordinance by selling books
without a license and with operating as a book agent without a license.
All licenses were subject to revocation at the discretion of the City
Commission with or without notice. Petitioner alleged that the un-
limited discretion in revocation of the license was an unconstitutional
encroachment upon freedom of the press. Lower court overruled this
contention and found petitioner guilty. Court of Appeals of Alabama
1942]
